Tuesday, May 17, 2011
Bosnia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
In recent years, many analysts have expressed concern that the international community’s efforts over the past 15 years to stabilize Bosnia are failing. Milorad Dodik, President of the Republika Srpska (RS), one of the two semi-autonomous “entities” within Bosnia, has obstructed efforts to make Bosnia’s central government more effective. He has repeatedly asserted the RS’s right to secede from Bosnia, although he has so far refrained from trying to make this threat a reality. A RS referendum, scheduled for June 2011, aimed at attacking the legitimacy of a central government-level court, may lead to a confrontation with the international community. Ethnic Croat leaders in Bosnia have called for the creation of a third, Croat “entity,” threatening a further fragmentation of the country. After two major Croat parties were excluded from the government of the Federation (the other autonomous “entity” in Bosnia), they refused to recognize its legitimacy and formed their own assembly. Bosnia has failed to form a central government, more than six months after October 2010 elections.
The Office of the High Representative (OHR), chosen by leading countries and international institutions, oversees implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia. It has the power to fire Bosnian officials and impose laws, if need be, to enforce the Dayton Accords. However, the international community has proved unwilling in recent years to back the High Representative in using these powers boldly, fearing a backlash among Bosnian Serb leaders. As a result, OHR has become increasingly ineffective, according to many observers.
The international community has vowed to close OHR after Bosnia meets a series of five objectives and two conditions, ending direct international oversight. However, the failure of Bosnia to achieve these objectives and conditions has led the European Union to consider plans to enhance its role, while leaving OHR to more limited tasks. The EU’s main inducement to enlist the cooperation of Bosnian leaders—the prospect of eventual EU membership—has so far proved insufficient. The prospect of NATO membership has also had little effect. In April 2010, NATO foreign ministers agreed to permit Bosnia to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) program, a key stepping-stone to membership for NATO. However, the ministers stressed that NATO will not accept Bosnia’s Annual National Plan under the program until the entities agree to the registration of defense installations as the property of the central government. Dodik has rejected doing so for installations on RS territory.
Some observers are concerned that the combination of internal tensions within Bosnia and a declining international role could perhaps lead to violence and the destabilization of the region as a whole. This could be more likely if the RS tried to secede from Bosnia. However, there are factors acting against conflict, including the lack of support for war among Bosnians, the reduction in the level of weaponry in the country since the war, and, the fact that neighboring Serbia and Croatia would not see a conflict as being in their interest, given their desire for EU membership.
According to the USAID “Greenbook,” the United States provided just over $2 billion in aid to Bosnia between FY 1993 and FY 2009. However, the U.S. role in the country has declined in recent years as the EU role has increased. The Obama Administration has stressed the importance of maintaining a close partnership with the EU in dealing with Bosnia. Like the EU, the United States has urged Bosnian politicians to agree to constitutional and other reforms to make Bosnia’s central government institutions more effective, so that the country can become a better candidate for eventual NATO and EU membership.
Date of Report: May 2, 2011
Number of Pages: 17
Order Number: R40479
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Monday, May 9, 2011
Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
On February 7, 2010, Viktor Yanukovych defeated Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko to win Ukraine’s presidency. International monitors praised the conduct of the election, although Tymoshenko charged that the election had been fraudulent. Yanukovych was able to quickly to form a new parliamentary majority in the current parliament by inducing dozens of supporters of the previous government to change sides.
The global economic crisis hit Ukraine hard. Ukraine’s real Gross Domestic Product fell by an estimated 15% in 2009. The economy began to recover in 2010, due in part to a surge in demand for Ukrainian steel exports. However, living standards for many Ukrainians remain low, leading to a rapid drop in Yanukovych’s popularity when compared to the period soon after his inauguration.
Under the leadership of former President Viktor Yushchenko from 2005-2010, Ukraine sought integration into the global economy and Euro-Atlantic institutions. In the longer term, Yushchenko set the goal of Ukrainian membership in the European Union and NATO. Relations with Russia were tense over such issues as Ukraine’s NATO aspirations and energy supplies. President Yanukovych has pursued closer ties with Russia, especially in the economic sphere. A major focus of his policy has been to seek reduced prices for natural gas supplies from Moscow. In April 2010, he agreed to extend the lease of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine for 25 years in exchange for a reduction in gas prices. Yanukovych has said EU integration is a key priority for Ukraine, but his administration appears to be wavering between a free trade agreement with the EU and an incompatible customs union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
During Yushchenko’s presidency, U.S. officials were upbeat about Ukraine’s successes in some areas, such as securing WTO membership, as well as in holding free and fair elections and improving media freedoms, while acknowledging difficulties in others, such as fighting corruption, establishing the rule of law, and adopting constitutional reforms. The Bush Administration strongly supported granting a Membership Action Plan to Ukraine at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, a key stepping-stone to NATO membership. However, opposition by Germany, France, and several other countries blocked the effort. The issue became moot after Viktor Yanukovych became president in February 2010 and announced that Ukraine would no longer seek NATO membership.
The Obama Administration has worked to “reset” relations with Russia, but has warned that it will not accept any country’s assertion of a sphere of influence, a reminder of U.S. support for Ukraine’s sovereignty. The Administration has not publicly expressed concern about what some observers view as the increasing pro-Russian tilt of Ukraine’s foreign policy under Yanukovych. The Administration has focused on practical issues, such as helping Ukraine rid itself of its supplies of highly enriched uranium, and diversifying Ukraine’s sources of energy, including advice on unconventional natural gas development. Administration officials have expressed concerns about regression in Ukraine’s democratic development since Yanukovych took power, including in such areas as media freedoms, election laws and the conduct of elections, and perceived selective prosecution of the government’s political opponents.
Date of Report: April 26, 2011
Number of Pages: 17
Order Number: RL33460
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Specialist in European Affairs
On February 7, 2010, Viktor Yanukovych defeated Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko to win Ukraine’s presidency. International monitors praised the conduct of the election, although Tymoshenko charged that the election had been fraudulent. Yanukovych was able to quickly to form a new parliamentary majority in the current parliament by inducing dozens of supporters of the previous government to change sides.
The global economic crisis hit Ukraine hard. Ukraine’s real Gross Domestic Product fell by an estimated 15% in 2009. The economy began to recover in 2010, due in part to a surge in demand for Ukrainian steel exports. However, living standards for many Ukrainians remain low, leading to a rapid drop in Yanukovych’s popularity when compared to the period soon after his inauguration.
Under the leadership of former President Viktor Yushchenko from 2005-2010, Ukraine sought integration into the global economy and Euro-Atlantic institutions. In the longer term, Yushchenko set the goal of Ukrainian membership in the European Union and NATO. Relations with Russia were tense over such issues as Ukraine’s NATO aspirations and energy supplies. President Yanukovych has pursued closer ties with Russia, especially in the economic sphere. A major focus of his policy has been to seek reduced prices for natural gas supplies from Moscow. In April 2010, he agreed to extend the lease of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine for 25 years in exchange for a reduction in gas prices. Yanukovych has said EU integration is a key priority for Ukraine, but his administration appears to be wavering between a free trade agreement with the EU and an incompatible customs union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
During Yushchenko’s presidency, U.S. officials were upbeat about Ukraine’s successes in some areas, such as securing WTO membership, as well as in holding free and fair elections and improving media freedoms, while acknowledging difficulties in others, such as fighting corruption, establishing the rule of law, and adopting constitutional reforms. The Bush Administration strongly supported granting a Membership Action Plan to Ukraine at the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, a key stepping-stone to NATO membership. However, opposition by Germany, France, and several other countries blocked the effort. The issue became moot after Viktor Yanukovych became president in February 2010 and announced that Ukraine would no longer seek NATO membership.
The Obama Administration has worked to “reset” relations with Russia, but has warned that it will not accept any country’s assertion of a sphere of influence, a reminder of U.S. support for Ukraine’s sovereignty. The Administration has not publicly expressed concern about what some observers view as the increasing pro-Russian tilt of Ukraine’s foreign policy under Yanukovych. The Administration has focused on practical issues, such as helping Ukraine rid itself of its supplies of highly enriched uranium, and diversifying Ukraine’s sources of energy, including advice on unconventional natural gas development. Administration officials have expressed concerns about regression in Ukraine’s democratic development since Yanukovych took power, including in such areas as media freedoms, election laws and the conduct of elections, and perceived selective prosecution of the government’s political opponents.
Date of Report: April 26, 2011
Number of Pages: 17
Order Number: RL33460
Price: $29.95
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Thursday, April 21, 2011
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
The United States recognized the independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia when the former Soviet Union broke up at the end of 1991. The United States has fostered these states’ ties with the West in part to end their dependence on Russia for trade, security, and other relations. The United States has pursued close ties with Armenia to encourage its democratization and because of concerns by Armenian-Americans and others over its fate. Close ties with Georgia have evolved from U.S. contacts with its pro-Western leadership. Successive Administrations have supported U.S. private investment in Azerbaijan’s energy sector as a means of increasing the diversity of world energy suppliers. The United States has been active in diplomatic efforts to resolve regional conflicts in the region. As part of the U.S. global counter-terrorism efforts, the U.S. military in 2002 began providing equipment and training for Georgia’s military and security forces. Troops from all three regional states have participated in stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The South Caucasian troops serving in Iraq departed in late 2008. The regional states also have granted transit privileges for U.S. military personnel and equipment bound for Afghanistan.
Beginning on August 7, 2008, Russia and Georgia warred over Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian troops quickly swept into Georgia, destroyed infrastructure, and tightened their de facto control over the breakaway regions before a ceasefire was concluded on August 15. The conflict has had long-term effects on security dynamics in the region and beyond. Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but the United States and nearly all other nations have refused to follow suit. Russia established bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia—in violation of the ceasefire accords—that buttress its long-time military presence in Armenia. Although there were some concerns that the South Caucasus had become less stable as a source and transit area for oil and gas, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are barging oil across the Caspian Sea for transit westward, and the European Union still plans to build the so-called Nabucco pipeline to bring Azerbaijani and other gas to Austria.
Key issues in the first session of the 112th Congress regarding the South Caucasus may include Armenia’s independence and economic development; Azerbaijan’s energy development; and Georgia’s recovery from Russia’s August 2008 military incursion. At the same time, concerns may include the status of human rights and democratization in the countries; the ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over the breakaway Nagorno Karabakh region; and threats posed to Georgia and the international order by Russia’s 2008 incursion and its diplomatic recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Congress may continue to scrutinize Armenia’s and Georgia’s reform progress as recipients of Millennium Challenge Account grants and the region’s role as part of the Northern Distribution Network for the transit of military supplies to support U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan. Some members of Congress and other policymakers believe that the United States should provide greater support for the region’s increasing role as an eastwest trade and security corridor linking the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, and for Armenia’s inclusion in such links. They urge greater U.S. aid and conflict resolution efforts to contain warfare, crime, smuggling, and terrorism, and to bolster the independence of the states. Others urge caution in adopting policies that will increase U.S. involvement in a region beset by ethnic and civil conflicts. .
Date of Report: April 15, 2011
Number of Pages: 48
Order Number: RL33453
Price: $29.95
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Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
The United States recognized the independence of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia when the former Soviet Union broke up at the end of 1991. The United States has fostered these states’ ties with the West in part to end their dependence on Russia for trade, security, and other relations. The United States has pursued close ties with Armenia to encourage its democratization and because of concerns by Armenian-Americans and others over its fate. Close ties with Georgia have evolved from U.S. contacts with its pro-Western leadership. Successive Administrations have supported U.S. private investment in Azerbaijan’s energy sector as a means of increasing the diversity of world energy suppliers. The United States has been active in diplomatic efforts to resolve regional conflicts in the region. As part of the U.S. global counter-terrorism efforts, the U.S. military in 2002 began providing equipment and training for Georgia’s military and security forces. Troops from all three regional states have participated in stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The South Caucasian troops serving in Iraq departed in late 2008. The regional states also have granted transit privileges for U.S. military personnel and equipment bound for Afghanistan.
Beginning on August 7, 2008, Russia and Georgia warred over Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian troops quickly swept into Georgia, destroyed infrastructure, and tightened their de facto control over the breakaway regions before a ceasefire was concluded on August 15. The conflict has had long-term effects on security dynamics in the region and beyond. Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but the United States and nearly all other nations have refused to follow suit. Russia established bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia—in violation of the ceasefire accords—that buttress its long-time military presence in Armenia. Although there were some concerns that the South Caucasus had become less stable as a source and transit area for oil and gas, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are barging oil across the Caspian Sea for transit westward, and the European Union still plans to build the so-called Nabucco pipeline to bring Azerbaijani and other gas to Austria.
Key issues in the first session of the 112th Congress regarding the South Caucasus may include Armenia’s independence and economic development; Azerbaijan’s energy development; and Georgia’s recovery from Russia’s August 2008 military incursion. At the same time, concerns may include the status of human rights and democratization in the countries; the ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over the breakaway Nagorno Karabakh region; and threats posed to Georgia and the international order by Russia’s 2008 incursion and its diplomatic recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Congress may continue to scrutinize Armenia’s and Georgia’s reform progress as recipients of Millennium Challenge Account grants and the region’s role as part of the Northern Distribution Network for the transit of military supplies to support U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan. Some members of Congress and other policymakers believe that the United States should provide greater support for the region’s increasing role as an eastwest trade and security corridor linking the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions, and for Armenia’s inclusion in such links. They urge greater U.S. aid and conflict resolution efforts to contain warfare, crime, smuggling, and terrorism, and to bolster the independence of the states. Others urge caution in adopting policies that will increase U.S. involvement in a region beset by ethnic and civil conflicts. .
Date of Report: April 15, 2011
Number of Pages: 48
Order Number: RL33453
Price: $29.95
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Wednesday, March 16, 2011
Kosovo: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. On February 18, the United States recognized Kosovo as an independent state. Of the 27 EU countries, 22 have recognized Kosovo, including key countries such as France, Germany, Britain, and Italy. Seventyfive countries in all have recognized Kosovo. When it declared independence, Kosovo pledged to implement the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, drafted by U.N. envoy Martti Ahtisaari. The document contains provisions aimed at safeguarding the rights of ethnic Serbs and other minorities. An International Civilian Representative and EULEX, an European Union-led law-and-order mission, are tasked with guaranteeing Kosovo’s implementation of the plan. KFOR, a NATO-led peacekeeping force, has the mission of providing a secure environment.
Serbia strongly objects to Kosovo’s declaration of independence. It has used diplomatic means to try to persuade countries to not recognize Kosovo. It has set up parallel governing institutions in Serb-majority areas in Kosovo and urged Serbs there to not cooperate with Kosovo government authorities. However, after a July 2010 International Court of Justice ruling that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not illegal, the EU pressured Serbia into agreeing to hold direct talks with Kosovo over technical issues. The talks got underway in March 2011.
Kosovo faces daunting challenges, aside from those posed by its struggle for international recognition and the status of its ethnic minorities. Kosovo’s problems are especially severe, as it has had little recent experience in self-rule, having been controlled by Serbia in the 1990s and by the international community from 1999 until 2008. According to a November 2010 European Commission report on Kosovo, the country suffers from weak institutions, including the judiciary and law enforcement. Kosovo has high levels of government corruption and powerful organized crime networks. Many Kosovars are poor and reported unemployment is very high.
In October 2010, Secretary of State Clinton visited Kosovo. She said the United States would continue to aid Kosovo’s efforts to build a democratic country, where the rule of law is respected and ethnic minorities are well-integrated. Clinton said the United States would assist Kosovo in its efforts to join the European Union and NATO. She expressed the United States’ strong support for upcoming talks between Serbia and Kosovo. She stressed that the issues of Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are not up for discussion during the negotiations. Instead, she said, the talks should focus on “immediate and practical needs” such as “increasing travel and trade.” She said that they should be “focused,” produce results, and be quickly concluded, noting that Serbia’s next elections are scheduled for 2012. In March 2010, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Countryman told journalists from the region that the U.S. role at the talks would be as a “guest,” not as a participant or mediator.
Since U.S. recognition of Kosovo’s independence in February 2008, congressional action on Kosovo has focused largely on foreign aid appropriations legislation. According to the FY2012 Function 150 Executive Budget Summary, Kosovo received $95 million in aid for political and economic reforms from the AEECA account in FY2010, as well as $2.5 million in FMF military aid, $0.7 million in IMET military training assistance, and $1.07 million in the NADR account for non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, demining and other functions. Congress has not adopted FY2011 foreign operations appropriations legislation so far, instead funding foreign aid with a series of continuing resolutions. Under such legislation, FY2011 U.S. aid to Kosovo may stay at roughly the same levels as in FY2010.
Date of Report: March 9, 2011
Number of Pages: 12
Order Number: RS21721
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Specialist in European Affairs
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. On February 18, the United States recognized Kosovo as an independent state. Of the 27 EU countries, 22 have recognized Kosovo, including key countries such as France, Germany, Britain, and Italy. Seventyfive countries in all have recognized Kosovo. When it declared independence, Kosovo pledged to implement the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, drafted by U.N. envoy Martti Ahtisaari. The document contains provisions aimed at safeguarding the rights of ethnic Serbs and other minorities. An International Civilian Representative and EULEX, an European Union-led law-and-order mission, are tasked with guaranteeing Kosovo’s implementation of the plan. KFOR, a NATO-led peacekeeping force, has the mission of providing a secure environment.
Serbia strongly objects to Kosovo’s declaration of independence. It has used diplomatic means to try to persuade countries to not recognize Kosovo. It has set up parallel governing institutions in Serb-majority areas in Kosovo and urged Serbs there to not cooperate with Kosovo government authorities. However, after a July 2010 International Court of Justice ruling that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not illegal, the EU pressured Serbia into agreeing to hold direct talks with Kosovo over technical issues. The talks got underway in March 2011.
Kosovo faces daunting challenges, aside from those posed by its struggle for international recognition and the status of its ethnic minorities. Kosovo’s problems are especially severe, as it has had little recent experience in self-rule, having been controlled by Serbia in the 1990s and by the international community from 1999 until 2008. According to a November 2010 European Commission report on Kosovo, the country suffers from weak institutions, including the judiciary and law enforcement. Kosovo has high levels of government corruption and powerful organized crime networks. Many Kosovars are poor and reported unemployment is very high.
In October 2010, Secretary of State Clinton visited Kosovo. She said the United States would continue to aid Kosovo’s efforts to build a democratic country, where the rule of law is respected and ethnic minorities are well-integrated. Clinton said the United States would assist Kosovo in its efforts to join the European Union and NATO. She expressed the United States’ strong support for upcoming talks between Serbia and Kosovo. She stressed that the issues of Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are not up for discussion during the negotiations. Instead, she said, the talks should focus on “immediate and practical needs” such as “increasing travel and trade.” She said that they should be “focused,” produce results, and be quickly concluded, noting that Serbia’s next elections are scheduled for 2012. In March 2010, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Countryman told journalists from the region that the U.S. role at the talks would be as a “guest,” not as a participant or mediator.
Since U.S. recognition of Kosovo’s independence in February 2008, congressional action on Kosovo has focused largely on foreign aid appropriations legislation. According to the FY2012 Function 150 Executive Budget Summary, Kosovo received $95 million in aid for political and economic reforms from the AEECA account in FY2010, as well as $2.5 million in FMF military aid, $0.7 million in IMET military training assistance, and $1.07 million in the NADR account for non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, demining and other functions. Congress has not adopted FY2011 foreign operations appropriations legislation so far, instead funding foreign aid with a series of continuing resolutions. Under such legislation, FY2011 U.S. aid to Kosovo may stay at roughly the same levels as in FY2010.
Date of Report: March 9, 2011
Number of Pages: 12
Order Number: RS21721
Price: $29.95
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Thursday, March 10, 2011
Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
Serbia faces an important crossroads in its development. It is seeking to integrate into the European Union (EU), but its progress has been hindered by a failure to arrest remaining indicted war criminals and by tensions with the United States and many EU countries over the independence of Serbia’s Kosovo province.
Parliamentary elections were held in Serbia on May 11, 2008. The new Serbian parliament approved a government coalition led by pro-Western forces, but which also includes the Socialist Party (once led by indicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic). The global economic crisis poses serious challenges for Serbia. The downturn has required painful austerity measures. In January 2009, the International Monetary Fund approved a $530 million stand-by loan for Serbia and another $4.2 billion loan in April. Serbia has also received loans from the World Bank and EU.
Serbia’s key foreign policy objectives are to secure membership in the European Union and to hinder international recognition of Kosovo’s independence. The European Union signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia on April 29, 2008. It provides a framework for enhanced cooperation between the EU and Serbia in a variety of fields, with the perspective of EU membership. In December 2009, the EU agreed to allow the trade provisions of the SAA to be implemented. The rest of the SAA will enter into force after the agreement is ratified by all EU member states. In December 2009, Serbia submitted an application to join the EU, but EU member governments have yet to decide whether to accept Serbia as a membership candidate. Even if Serbia is accepted as a candidate, years of negotiations will be required before it can join.
Serbia has vowed to take “all legal and diplomatic measures” to preserve its former province of Kosovo as part of Serbia. So far, 75 countries, including the United States and 22 of 27 EU countries, have recognized Kosovo’s independence. Russia, Serbia’s ally on the issue, has used the threat of its Security Council veto to block U.N. membership for Kosovo. Serbia’s diplomatic strategy suffered a setback when the International Court of Justice ruled in July 2010 that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not contravene international law. After the ruling, in part due to substantial pressure by the EU, Serbia agreed to hold EU-brokered talks with Kosovo on technical issues. The talks are planned to begin in March 2011.
In December 2006, Serbia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. PFP is aimed at helping countries come closer to NATO standards and at promoting their cooperation with NATO. Although it supports NATO membership for all of its neighbors, Serbia is not seeking NATO membership. This may be due to such factors as memories of NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999, U.S. support for Kosovo’s independence, and a desire to maintain close ties with Russia.
U.S.-Serbian relations have improved since the United States recognized Kosovo’s independence in February 2008, when Serbia sharply condemned the U.S. move and demonstrators sacked a portion of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade. During a May 2009 visit to Belgrade, Vice President Joseph Biden stressed strong U.S. support for close ties with Serbia. He said the countries could “agree to disagree” on Kosovo’s independence. He called on Serbia to transfer the remaining war criminals to the ICTY, promote reform in neighboring Bosnia, and cooperate with international bodies in Kosovo.
Date of Report: March 1, 2011
Number of Pages: 12
Order Number: RS22601
Price: $29.95
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Specialist in European Affairs
Serbia faces an important crossroads in its development. It is seeking to integrate into the European Union (EU), but its progress has been hindered by a failure to arrest remaining indicted war criminals and by tensions with the United States and many EU countries over the independence of Serbia’s Kosovo province.
Parliamentary elections were held in Serbia on May 11, 2008. The new Serbian parliament approved a government coalition led by pro-Western forces, but which also includes the Socialist Party (once led by indicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic). The global economic crisis poses serious challenges for Serbia. The downturn has required painful austerity measures. In January 2009, the International Monetary Fund approved a $530 million stand-by loan for Serbia and another $4.2 billion loan in April. Serbia has also received loans from the World Bank and EU.
Serbia’s key foreign policy objectives are to secure membership in the European Union and to hinder international recognition of Kosovo’s independence. The European Union signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia on April 29, 2008. It provides a framework for enhanced cooperation between the EU and Serbia in a variety of fields, with the perspective of EU membership. In December 2009, the EU agreed to allow the trade provisions of the SAA to be implemented. The rest of the SAA will enter into force after the agreement is ratified by all EU member states. In December 2009, Serbia submitted an application to join the EU, but EU member governments have yet to decide whether to accept Serbia as a membership candidate. Even if Serbia is accepted as a candidate, years of negotiations will be required before it can join.
Serbia has vowed to take “all legal and diplomatic measures” to preserve its former province of Kosovo as part of Serbia. So far, 75 countries, including the United States and 22 of 27 EU countries, have recognized Kosovo’s independence. Russia, Serbia’s ally on the issue, has used the threat of its Security Council veto to block U.N. membership for Kosovo. Serbia’s diplomatic strategy suffered a setback when the International Court of Justice ruled in July 2010 that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not contravene international law. After the ruling, in part due to substantial pressure by the EU, Serbia agreed to hold EU-brokered talks with Kosovo on technical issues. The talks are planned to begin in March 2011.
In December 2006, Serbia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. PFP is aimed at helping countries come closer to NATO standards and at promoting their cooperation with NATO. Although it supports NATO membership for all of its neighbors, Serbia is not seeking NATO membership. This may be due to such factors as memories of NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999, U.S. support for Kosovo’s independence, and a desire to maintain close ties with Russia.
U.S.-Serbian relations have improved since the United States recognized Kosovo’s independence in February 2008, when Serbia sharply condemned the U.S. move and demonstrators sacked a portion of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade. During a May 2009 visit to Belgrade, Vice President Joseph Biden stressed strong U.S. support for close ties with Serbia. He said the countries could “agree to disagree” on Kosovo’s independence. He called on Serbia to transfer the remaining war criminals to the ICTY, promote reform in neighboring Bosnia, and cooperate with international bodies in Kosovo.
Date of Report: March 1, 2011
Number of Pages: 12
Order Number: RS22601
Price: $29.95
Follow us on TWITTER at http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports
Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.
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