Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy Concerns

Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs

Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko snuffed out Belarus’s modest progress toward democracy and a free market economy in the early 1990s and created an authoritarian, Sovietstyle regime. Belarus has close historical and cultural ties to Russia. Efforts to establish a political and economic “union” between the two countries have had substantial public support in Belarus. Nevertheless, the pace of integration between Belarus and Russia has been fitful. Current Russian policy toward Belarus appears to be focused on gaining control of Belarus’s economic assets while reducing the costs of subsidizing the Belarusian economy.

For many years, the United States limited ties to the regime while providing modest support to pro-democracy organizations in Belarus. The United States and the European Union also imposed sanctions on Belarusian leaders. In March 2008, Belarus withdrew its ambassador from Washington and forced the United States to recall its ambassador from Minsk, in response to what Belarus perceived as a tightening of U.S. sanctions against Belneftekhim, the state-owned petrochemicals firm. Later in 2008, the United States and European Union suspended some sanctions in exchange for very modest improvements on human rights issues.

This policy suffered a setback in December 2010, when Belarus held presidential elections that observers from the OSCE viewed as falling far short of international standards. Moreover, in response to an election-night demonstration against electoral fraud in a square in central Minsk, the Lukashenko regime arrested over 700 persons, including most of his opponents in the election, as well as activists, journalists, and civil society representatives. Some of those detained were viciously beaten by police. On January 31, 2011, the EU and the United States imposed enhanced visa and financial sanctions against top Belarusian officials. The United States also reimposed sanctions against two key subsidiaries of Belneftekhim. They also pledged enhanced support for Belarusian pro-democracy and civil society groups. Although Lukaskhenko has released most of the political prisoners, he has continued to imprison at least 10. In response, the United States and the EU have imposed sanctions against additional prominent Belarusian officials, and the businessmen and firms associated with them.

Congress has responded to the situation in Belarus with legislation. In January 2012, President Obama signed the Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act. The legislation reauthorizes the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004. It updates the provisions of the legislation to include the fraudulent December 2010 election and the ensuing crackdown. It also updates the report the Administration is required to file to include assistance provided by other governments or organizations to assist the Belarusian government’s efforts to control the Internet. The bill says it is the policy of the United States to call on the International Ice Hockey Federation to suspend its plan to hold the 2014 International World Ice Hockey championship in Minsk until the government of Belarus releases all political prisoners. The move would be a serious blow to Lukashenko personally, as he is known to be an avid hockey fan. .


Date of Report: May 3, 2012
Number of Pages: 10
Order Number: RS21982
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Kosovo: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs

On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. On February 18, the
United States recognized Kosovo as an independent state. Of the 27 EU countries, 22 have
recognized Kosovo, including key countries such as France, Germany, Britain, and Italy. Eightyeight
countries in all have recognized Kosovo. When it declared independence, Kosovo pledged
to implement the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, drafted by U.N.
envoy Martti Ahtisaari. The document contains provisions aimed at safeguarding the rights of
ethnic Serbs and other minorities. An International Civilian Representative and EULEX, a
European Union-led law-and-order mission, are tasked with guaranteeing Kosovo’s
implementation of the plan. KFOR, a NATO-led peacekeeping force, has the mission of providing
a secure environment.


Serbia strongly objects to Kosovo’s declaration of independence. It has used diplomatic means to
try to persuade countries to not recognize Kosovo. It has set up parallel governing institutions in
Serb-majority areas in Kosovo. However, after a July 2010 International Court of Justice ruling
that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not illegal, the EU pressured Serbia into agreeing
to hold direct talks with Kosovo over technical issues. The talks, which got underway in March
2011, have produced agreements on freedom of movement, trade, land registry records, and other
issues. However, the deployment of Kosovo police units to northern Kosovo in July 2011 sparked
violence and blockades of local roads by Serbs. KFOR then took over control of two border posts
in the north. The deployment of Kosovo customs officials to the posts in September caused Serbs
to reimpose their road blockades, leading to clashes with KFOR. Serbia broke off the talks with
Kosovo for a short time, but then soon returned to them.


Kosovo faces other daunting challenges, aside from those posed by its struggle for international
recognition and the status of its ethnic minorities. According to an October 2011 European
Commission report on Kosovo, the country suffers from weak institutions, including the judiciary
and law enforcement. Kosovo has high levels of government corruption and powerful organized
crime networks. Many Kosovars are poor and reported unemployment is very high.


The United States has strongly supported the Serbia-Kosovo talks. U.S. officials have stressed
that the United States is a “guest,” not as a participant or mediator at the talks. In July 2011, a
State Department spokesman expressed U.S. “regret” that the Kosovo government tried to take
control of customs posts in Serb-dominated northern Kosovo without consulting the international
community. The United States condemned violence by Serbs in northern Kosovo and called on
them to restore freedom of movement in the area and for Serbia to “remain committed” to the
EU-mediated talks with Kosovo.


Since U.S. recognition of Kosovo’s independence in February 2008, congressional action on
Kosovo has focused largely on foreign aid appropriations legislation. Aid to Kosovo has declined
significantly in recent years. In FY2011, Kosovo received a total of $85.428 million in U.S. aid.
In FY2012, Kosovo will receive an estimated $67.45 million. For FY2013, the Administration
requested a total of $57.669 million for Kosovo. Of this amount, $42.544 million is aid for
political and economic reforms from the Economic Support Fund, $10.674 million from the
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account, $0.7 million in IMET military
training aid, $3 million in Foreign Military Financing, and $0.75 million in NADR aid to assist
non-proliferation and anti-terrorism efforts.


Date of Report: March 13, 2012
Number of Pages: 14
Order Number: RS21721
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Russia’s March 2012 Presidential Election: Outcome and Implications

Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs

Challenges to Russia’s democratic development have long been of concern to Congress as it has considered the course of U.S.-Russia cooperation. The Obama Administration has been critical of the apparently flawed Russian presidential election which took place on March 4, 2012, but has called for continued engagement with Russia and newly elected President Vladimir Putin on issues of mutual strategic concern. Some in Congress also have criticized the conduct of the election, but have endorsed continued engagement, while others have called for stepping back and reevaluating the Administration’s engagement policy. Congress may consider the implications of another Putin presidency, lagging democratization, and human rights abuses in Russia as it debates possible future foreign assistance and trade legislation and other aspects of U.S.-Russia relations.

Five candidates were able to register for the March 4, 2012, presidential election. Of these, Prime Minister Putin had announced in September 2011 that he intended to switch positions with current President Dmitriy Medvedev, and return to the presidency for a third term. Three of the other four candidates—Communist Party head Gennadiy Zyuganov, Liberal Democratic Party head Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, and A Just Russia Party head Sergey Mironov—were nominated by parties with seats in the Duma. The remaining candidate, businessman Mikhail Prokhorov, was self-nominated and was required to gather 2 million signatures to register. Other prospective candidates dropped out or were disqualified on technical grounds by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC). Opposition Yabloko Party head Grigoriy Yavlinskiy was disqualified by the CEC on the grounds that over 5% of the signatures he gathered were invalid. Many critics argued that he was eliminated because he would have been the only bona fide opposition candidate on the ballot. Of the registered candidates running against Putin, all but Prokhorov had run in previous presidential elections and lost badly.

According to the final report of the CEC, Putin won 63.6% of 71.8 million votes cast, somewhat less than the 71.3% he had received in his last presidential election in 2004. In their preliminary report, monitors led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concluded that the election was well organized but that there were several problems. Although the report did not state outright that the election was “not free and fair,” some of the monitors at a press conference stated that they had not viewed it as free and fair. According to the report, Prime Minister Putin received an advantage in media coverage, and authorities mobilized local officials and resources to garner support for Putin. The OSCE monitors witnessed irregularities in votecounting in nearly one-third of the 98 polling stations visited and in about 15% of 72 higher-level territorial electoral commissions.

The initial protests after Putin’s election by those who view the electoral process as tainted appeared smaller in size and number than after the Duma election. Authorities approved a protest rally in Pushkin Square in central Moscow on March 5, along with Putin victory rallies elsewhere in the city. After some of the protesters allegedly did not disperse after the time for the rally had elapsed, police forcibly intervened and reportedly detained up to 250 demonstrators, including activist Alexey Navalny, who later was released.


Date of Report: March 14, 2012
Number of Pages: 15
Order Number: R42407
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Serbia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs

Serbia faces an important crossroads in its development. It is seeking to integrate into the European Union (EU), but its progress has been hindered by tensions with the United States and many EU countries over the independence of Serbia’s former Kosovo province.

Serbia’s government is a coalition led by pro-EU forces. The global economic crisis poses serious challenges for Serbia. Painful austerity measures have been required for Serbia to receive loans from the IMF and other international financial institutions. High unemployment and poor living standards could result in the coming to power of forces more skeptical of close ties with the United States and the EU after parliamentary elections are held in May 2012.

Serbia’s key foreign policy objectives are to secure membership in the European Union and to hinder international recognition of Kosovo’s independence. In December 2009, Serbia submitted an application to join the EU, but the EU has delayed a decision on whether to accept Serbia as a membership candidate. The EU may accept Serbia in March 2012, if it judges Belgrade has made sufficient progress in reaching agreements with Kosovo on a series of issues, and in implementing them. However, even if Serbia is accepted as a candidate, many years of negotiations will be required before it can join the EU.

Serbia has vowed to take “all legal and diplomatic measures” to preserve its former province of Kosovo as legally part of Serbia. So far, 76 countries, including the United States and 22 of 27 EU countries, have recognized Kosovo’s independence. Russia, Serbia’s ally on the issue, has used the threat of its Security Council veto to block U.N. membership for Kosovo. After the International Court of Justice ruled in July 2010 that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not contravene international law, the EU pressured Serbia to hold talks with Kosovo. EUbrokered talks on trade, freedom of movement and other issues began in March 2011.

In December 2006, Serbia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. PFP is aimed at helping countries come closer to NATO standards and at promoting their cooperation with NATO. Although it supports NATO membership for its neighbors, Serbia is not seeking NATO membership. This may be due to such factors as memories of NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999, U.S. support for Kosovo’s independence, and a desire to maintain close ties with Russia.

U.S.-Serbian relations have improved since the United States recognized Kosovo’s independence in February 2008, when Serbia sharply condemned the U.S. move and demonstrators sacked a portion of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade. During a 2009 visit to Belgrade, Vice President Joseph Biden stressed strong U.S. support for close ties with Serbia. He said the countries could “agree to disagree” on Kosovo’s independence. He called on Serbia to transfer the remaining war criminals to the ICTY, promote reform in neighboring Bosnia, and cooperate with international bodies in Kosovo. The United States has strongly supported the EU-led talks between Kosovo and Serbia, while making clear that it plays no direct role in them.


Date of Report: February 15, 2012
Number of Pages: 13
Order Number: RS22601
Price: $29.95

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Kosovo: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs

On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. On February 18, the United States recognized Kosovo as an independent state. Of the 27 EU countries, 22 have recognized Kosovo, including key countries such as France, Germany, Britain, and Italy. Eightyeight countries in all have recognized Kosovo. When it declared independence, Kosovo pledged to implement the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, drafted by U.N. envoy Martti Ahtisaari. The document contains provisions aimed at safeguarding the rights of ethnic Serbs and other minorities. An International Civilian Representative and EULEX, an European Union-led law-and-order mission, are tasked with guaranteeing Kosovo’s implementation of the plan. KFOR, a NATO-led peacekeeping force, has the mission of providing a secure environment.

Serbia strongly objects to Kosovo’s declaration of independence. It has used diplomatic means to try to persuade countries to not recognize Kosovo. It has set up parallel governing institutions in Serb-majority areas in Kosovo. However, after a July 2010 International Court of Justice ruling that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not illegal, the EU pressured Serbia into agreeing to hold direct talks with Kosovo over technical issues. The talks, which got underway in March 2011, have produced agreements on freedom of movement, trade, land registry records, and other issues. However, the deployment of Kosovo police units to northern Kosovo in July 2011 sparked violence and blockades of local roads by Serbs. KFOR then took over control of two border posts in the north. The deployment of Kosovo customs officials to the posts in September caused Serbs to reimpose their road blockades, leading to clashes with KFOR. Serbia broke off the talks with Kosovo for a short time, but then soon returned to them.

Kosovo faces other daunting challenges, aside from those posed by its struggle for international recognition and the status of its ethnic minorities. According to an October 2011 European Commission report on Kosovo, the country suffers from weak institutions, including the judiciary and law enforcement. Kosovo has high levels of government corruption and powerful organized crime networks. Many Kosovars are poor and reported unemployment is very high.

The United States has strongly supported the Serbia-Kosovo talks. U.S. officials have stressed that the United States is a “guest,” not as a participant or mediator at the talks. In July 2011, a State Department spokesman expressed U.S. “regret” that the Kosovo government tried to take control of customs posts in Serb-dominated northern Kosovo without consulting the international community. The United States condemned violence by Serbs in northern Kosovo and called on them to restore freedom of movement in the area and for Serbia to “remain committed” to the EU-mediated talks with Kosovo.

Since U.S. recognition of Kosovo’s independence in February 2008, congressional action on Kosovo has focused largely on foreign aid appropriations legislation. Aid to Kosovo has declined significantly in recent years. In FY2011, Kosovo received $79 million in AEECA funding for political and economic reforms, $3.59 million in FMF military aid, $0.7 million in IMET military training assistance, and $0.75 million from the NADR account to combat proliferation and terrorism and for demining. For FY2012, the Administration requested $63 million for Kosovo from the AEECA account, $0.7 million in IMET, $3 million in FMF, and $0.75 million in NADR aid.


Date of Report: February 9, 2012
Number of Pages: 13
Order Number: RS21721
Price: $29.95

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