Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests

Jim Nichol, Coordinator
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs

Russia made some uneven progress in democratization during the 1990s, but according to many observers, this limited progress was reversed after Vladimir Putin rose to power in 1999-2000. During this period, the State Duma (lower legislative chamber) came to be dominated by government-approved parties and opposition democratic parties were excluded. Putin also abolished gubernatorial elections and established government ownership or control over major media and industries, including the energy sector. The methods used by the Putin government to suppress insurgency in the North Caucasus demonstrated a low regard for the rule of law and human rights, according to critics. Dmitriy Medvedev, Vladimir Putin’s chosen successor and long-time protégé, was elected president in early 2008 and immediately designated Putin as prime minister. President Medvedev continued Putin’s policies. In August 2008, the Medvedev-Putin “tandem” directed wide-scale military operations against Georgia and unilaterally recognized the independence of Georgia’s separatist South Ossetia and Abkhazia, actions denounced by most of the international community. In late 2011, Putin announced that he and Medvedev had decided that Putin would return to the presidency and that Medvedev would become his prime minister. At the March 2012 presidential election, Putin was reelected by a wide margin. The day after Putin’s inauguration on May 7, 2012, the legislature confirmed Medvedev as prime minister.

Russia’s economy began to recover from the Soviet collapse in 1999, led mainly by oil and gas exports, but the decline in oil and gas prices and other aspects of the global economic downturn beginning in 2008 contributed to an 8% drop in gross domestic product in 2009. Since then, rising world oil prices have bolstered the economy. Russia continues to be challenged by an economy highly dependent on the production of oil, gas, and other natural resources. It is also plagued by an unreformed healthcare system and unhealthy lifestyles; low domestic and foreign investment; and high rates of crime, corruption, capital flight, and unemployment.

Russia’s military has been in turmoil after years of severe force reductions and budget cuts. The armed forces now number less than 1.0 million, down from 4.3 million Soviet troops in 1986. Troop readiness, training, morale, and discipline have suffered, and much of the arms industry has become antiquated. Russia’s economic growth during most of the 2000s allowed it to increase defense spending to begin to address these problems. Stepped-up efforts were launched in late 2007 to restructure the armed forces to improve their quality. Opposition among some in the armed forces, mismanagement, and corruption have appeared to slow force modernization efforts.

After the Soviet Union’s collapse, the United States sought a cooperative relationship with Moscow and supplied almost $19 billion in aid for Russia from FY1992 through FY2010 to encourage democracy and market reforms and in particular to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). U.S. aid to reduce the threat posed by WMD proliferation has hovered around $700 million-$900 million per fiscal year, while other foreign aid to Russia has dwindled in recent years. In the past, U.S.-Russia tensions on issues such as NATO enlargement and proposed U.S. missile defenses in Eastern Europe were accompanied by some cooperation between the two countries on anti-terrorism and non-proliferation. Russia’s 2008 conflict with Georgia, however, threatened such cooperation. The Obama Administration has worked to “re-set” relations with Russia. The Administration has hailed the signing of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in April 2010, the approval of new sanctions against Iran by Russia and other members of the U.N. Security Council in June 2010, and cooperation in Afghanistan as signifying the “re-set” of bilateral relations. .


Date of Report: June 7, 2012
Number of Pages: 76
Order Number: RL33407
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Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests

Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs

U.S. policy toward the Central Asian states has aimed at facilitating their cooperation with U.S. and NATO stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and their efforts to combat terrorism; proliferation; and trafficking in arms, drugs, and persons. Other U.S. objectives have included promoting free markets, democratization, human rights, energy development, and the forging of East-West and Central Asia-South Asia trade links. Such policies aim to help the states become what various U.S. administrations have considered to be responsible members of the international community rather than to degenerate into xenophobic, extremist, and anti-Western regimes that contribute to wider regional conflict and instability.

Soon after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian “front-line” states offered over-flight and other support for coalition anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. In 2003, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also endorsed coalition military action in Iraq. About two dozen Kazakhstani troops served in Iraq until late 2008. Uzbekistan rescinded U.S. basing rights in 2005 after the United States criticized the reported killing of civilians in the town of Andijon. In early 2009, Kyrgyzstan ordered a U.S. base in that country to close, allegedly because of Russian inducements and U.S. reluctance to meet Kyrgyz requests for greatly increased lease payments. An agreement on continued U.S. use of the Manas Transit Center was reached in June 2009. In recent years, most of the regional states also participate in the Northern Distribution Network for the transport of U.S. and NATO supplies into and out of Afghanistan.

Policymakers have tailored U.S. policy in Central Asia to the varying characteristics of these states. U.S. interests in Kazakhstan have included securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear and biological weapons materials and facilities. U.S. energy firms have invested in oil and natural gas development in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and successive administrations have backed diverse export routes to the West for these resources. U.S. policy toward Kyrgyzstan has long included support for its civil society. In Tajikistan, the United States focuses on developmental assistance to bolster the fragile economy and address high poverty rates. U.S. relations with Uzbekistan—the most populous state in the heart of the region—were cool after 2005, but recently have improved.

Congress has been at the forefront in advocating increased U.S. ties with Central Asia, and in providing backing for the region for the transit of equipment and supplies for U.S.-led stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Congress has pursued these goals through hearings and legislation on humanitarian, economic, and democratization assistance; security issues; and human rights. During the 112th Congress, the Members may review assistance for bolstering regional border and customs controls and other safeguards to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), combating trafficking in persons and drugs, encouraging regional integration with South Asia and Europe, advancing energy security, and countering terrorism. Support for these goals also has been viewed as contributing to stabilization and reconstruction operations by the United States and NATO in Afghanistan. For several years, Congress has placed conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan because of concerns about human rights abuses and lagging democratization. Congress will continue to consider how to balance these varied U.S. interests in the region.


Date of Report: May 31, 2012
Number of Pages: 61
Order Number: RL33458
Price: $29.95

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Russian Political, Economic, and Security Issues and U.S. Interests

Jim Nichol, Coordinator
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs

Russia made some uneven progress in democratization during the 1990s, but according to many observers, this limited progress was reversed after Vladimir Putin rose to power in 1999-2000. During this period, the State Duma (lower legislative chamber) came to be dominated by government-approved parties and opposition democratic parties were excluded. Putin also abolished gubernatorial elections and established government ownership or control over major media and industries, including the energy sector. The methods used by the Putin government to suppress insurgency in the North Caucasus demonstrated a low regard for the rule of law and human rights, according to critics. Dmitriy Medvedev, Vladimir Putin’s chosen successor and long-time protégé, was elected president in early 2008 and immediately designated Putin as prime minister. President Medvedev continued Putin’s policies. In August 2008, the Medvedev-Putin “tandem” directed wide-scale military operations against Georgia and unilaterally recognized the independence of Georgia’s separatist South Ossetia and Abkhazia, actions denounced by most of the international community. In late 2011, Putin announced that he and Medvedev had decided that Putin would return to the presidency and that Medvedev would become his prime minister. At the March 2012 presidential election, Putin was reelected by a wide margin. The day after Putin’s inauguration on May 7, 2012, the legislature confirmed Medvedev as prime minister.

Russia’s economy began to recover from the Soviet collapse in 1999, led mainly by oil and gas exports, but the decline in oil and gas prices and other aspects of the global economic downturn beginning in 2008 contributed to an 8% drop in gross domestic product in 2009. Since then, rising world oil prices have bolstered the economy. Russia continues to be challenged by an economy highly dependent on the production of oil, gas, and other natural resources. It is also plagued by an unreformed healthcare system and unhealthy lifestyles; low domestic and foreign investment; and high rates of crime, corruption, capital flight, and unemployment.

Russia’s military has been in turmoil after years of severe force reductions and budget cuts. The armed forces now number less than 1.0 million, down from 4.3 million Soviet troops in 1986. Troop readiness, training, morale, and discipline have suffered, and much of the arms industry has become antiquated. Russia’s economic growth during most of the 2000s allowed it to increase defense spending to begin to address these problems. Stepped-up efforts were launched in late 2007 to restructure the armed forces to improve their quality. Opposition among some in the armed forces, mismanagement, and corruption have appeared to slow force modernization efforts.

After the Soviet Union’s collapse, the United States sought a cooperative relationship with Moscow and supplied almost $19 billion in aid for Russia from FY1992 through FY2010 to encourage democracy and market reforms and in particular to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). U.S. aid to reduce the threat posed by WMD proliferation has hovered around $700 million-$900 million per fiscal year, while other foreign aid to Russia has dwindled in recent years. In the past, U.S.-Russia tensions on issues such as NATO enlargement and proposed U.S. missile defenses in Eastern Europe were accompanied by some cooperation between the two countries on anti-terrorism and non-proliferation. Russia’s 2008 conflict with Georgia, however, threatened such cooperation. The Obama Administration has worked to “re-set” relations with Russia. The Administration has hailed the signing of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in April 2010, the approval of new sanctions against Iran by Russia and other members of the U.N. Security Council in June 2010, and cooperation in Afghanistan as signifying the “re-set” of bilateral relations.


Date of Report: June 1, 2012
Number of Pages: 76
Order Number: RL33407
Price: $29.95

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Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy Concerns

Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs

Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko snuffed out Belarus’s modest progress toward democracy and a free market economy in the early 1990s and created an authoritarian, Sovietstyle regime. Belarus has close historical and cultural ties to Russia. Efforts to establish a political and economic “union” between the two countries have had substantial public support in Belarus. Nevertheless, the pace of integration between Belarus and Russia has been fitful. Current Russian policy toward Belarus appears to be focused on gaining control of Belarus’s economic assets while reducing the costs of subsidizing the Belarusian economy.

For many years, the United States limited ties to the regime while providing modest support to pro-democracy organizations in Belarus. The United States and the European Union also imposed sanctions on Belarusian leaders. In March 2008, Belarus withdrew its ambassador from Washington and forced the United States to recall its ambassador from Minsk, in response to what Belarus perceived as a tightening of U.S. sanctions against Belneftekhim, the state-owned petrochemicals firm. Later in 2008, the United States and European Union suspended some sanctions in exchange for very modest improvements on human rights issues.

This policy suffered a setback in December 2010, when Belarus held presidential elections that observers from the OSCE viewed as falling far short of international standards. Moreover, in response to an election-night demonstration against electoral fraud in a square in central Minsk, the Lukashenko regime arrested over 700 persons, including most of his opponents in the election, as well as activists, journalists, and civil society representatives. Some of those detained were viciously beaten by police. On January 31, 2011, the EU and the United States imposed enhanced visa and financial sanctions against top Belarusian officials. The United States also reimposed sanctions against two key subsidiaries of Belneftekhim. They also pledged enhanced support for Belarusian pro-democracy and civil society groups. Although Lukaskhenko has released most of the political prisoners, he has continued to imprison at least 10. In response, the United States and the EU have imposed sanctions against additional prominent Belarusian officials, and the businessmen and firms associated with them.

Congress has responded to the situation in Belarus with legislation. In January 2012, President Obama signed the Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act. The legislation reauthorizes the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004. It updates the provisions of the legislation to include the fraudulent December 2010 election and the ensuing crackdown. It also updates the report the Administration is required to file to include assistance provided by other governments or organizations to assist the Belarusian government’s efforts to control the Internet. The bill says it is the policy of the United States to call on the International Ice Hockey Federation to suspend its plan to hold the 2014 International World Ice Hockey championship in Minsk until the government of Belarus releases all political prisoners. The move would be a serious blow to Lukashenko personally, as he is known to be an avid hockey fan. .


Date of Report: May 3, 2012
Number of Pages: 10
Order Number: RS21982
Price: $29.95

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Kosovo: Current Issues and U.S. Policy

Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs

On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. On February 18, the
United States recognized Kosovo as an independent state. Of the 27 EU countries, 22 have
recognized Kosovo, including key countries such as France, Germany, Britain, and Italy. Eightyeight
countries in all have recognized Kosovo. When it declared independence, Kosovo pledged
to implement the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, drafted by U.N.
envoy Martti Ahtisaari. The document contains provisions aimed at safeguarding the rights of
ethnic Serbs and other minorities. An International Civilian Representative and EULEX, a
European Union-led law-and-order mission, are tasked with guaranteeing Kosovo’s
implementation of the plan. KFOR, a NATO-led peacekeeping force, has the mission of providing
a secure environment.


Serbia strongly objects to Kosovo’s declaration of independence. It has used diplomatic means to
try to persuade countries to not recognize Kosovo. It has set up parallel governing institutions in
Serb-majority areas in Kosovo. However, after a July 2010 International Court of Justice ruling
that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not illegal, the EU pressured Serbia into agreeing
to hold direct talks with Kosovo over technical issues. The talks, which got underway in March
2011, have produced agreements on freedom of movement, trade, land registry records, and other
issues. However, the deployment of Kosovo police units to northern Kosovo in July 2011 sparked
violence and blockades of local roads by Serbs. KFOR then took over control of two border posts
in the north. The deployment of Kosovo customs officials to the posts in September caused Serbs
to reimpose their road blockades, leading to clashes with KFOR. Serbia broke off the talks with
Kosovo for a short time, but then soon returned to them.


Kosovo faces other daunting challenges, aside from those posed by its struggle for international
recognition and the status of its ethnic minorities. According to an October 2011 European
Commission report on Kosovo, the country suffers from weak institutions, including the judiciary
and law enforcement. Kosovo has high levels of government corruption and powerful organized
crime networks. Many Kosovars are poor and reported unemployment is very high.


The United States has strongly supported the Serbia-Kosovo talks. U.S. officials have stressed
that the United States is a “guest,” not as a participant or mediator at the talks. In July 2011, a
State Department spokesman expressed U.S. “regret” that the Kosovo government tried to take
control of customs posts in Serb-dominated northern Kosovo without consulting the international
community. The United States condemned violence by Serbs in northern Kosovo and called on
them to restore freedom of movement in the area and for Serbia to “remain committed” to the
EU-mediated talks with Kosovo.


Since U.S. recognition of Kosovo’s independence in February 2008, congressional action on
Kosovo has focused largely on foreign aid appropriations legislation. Aid to Kosovo has declined
significantly in recent years. In FY2011, Kosovo received a total of $85.428 million in U.S. aid.
In FY2012, Kosovo will receive an estimated $67.45 million. For FY2013, the Administration
requested a total of $57.669 million for Kosovo. Of this amount, $42.544 million is aid for
political and economic reforms from the Economic Support Fund, $10.674 million from the
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account, $0.7 million in IMET military
training aid, $3 million in Foreign Military Financing, and $0.75 million in NADR aid to assist
non-proliferation and anti-terrorism efforts.


Date of Report: March 13, 2012
Number of Pages: 14
Order Number: RS21721
Price: $29.95

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